It is the abolishment of theism as a tool for social segregation. Similarly, a secular institution will not respect the establishment of any belief system for this reason. However, it's popularly understood as a "wall of separation between Church and State".1 In the Constitution of the United States, the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion".2
This is interpreted by some to mean that no national Church (as is the case with the Church of England in England) is to be established. It's more broadly construed by others still to mean that the government has no business pushing religious beliefs on its people (see: teaching creationism in public schools et. al). This is the view taken by some leftists. It also seems to be the view of proclaimed atheist Jessica Ahlquist, who was asked to serve as a plaintiff in the lawsuit against her school by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).3
What was the issue at hand? Ahlquist's school, Cranston West, had a prayer banner displayed on its walls. Since Cranston West is a public school, it follows that it shouldn't be allowed to display religious messages because it would be non-secular, right? Wrong. The display of a religious banner inside a public school does not qualify as non-secularism. Let us refer to a 1984 Supreme Court case on which the judge of this case used as a partial basis for his decision. The issue in this case was whether or not the inclusion of a Nativity scene violated the Establishment clause.4 In its decision, the Court ruled:
The usage of the term "political community" suggests a realm of constituents who possess exclusive access to means with which they can affect the political process of the wider school community. That means that their participation has greater weight than a non-adherent. But if individual participation in the school community is equal, then what power is conferred to the individual who happens to be 'favored'? What is 'favoritism' if there is no community to be favored into? Further, if there is no favoritism, how can the promotion of religion be justified in this case?
There is no 'political' community because the display of such a banner has not warranted the creation of such a political divide. The banner has played no significant role in determining who may or may not participate as full members of the school community. To even bring politics into an educational setting in this case is absurd.
This is not about the balance of power between individuals in the decision making process affecting the school community or the principles which lend weight to that power and hence shape subsequent relations ... there is no politics involved in this case. The only community that could be considered 'political' by this definition is the student council or some equivalent, and in most schools, it's merely a figure-head with no real influence in deciding how the school is ran.
I am aware that the above is not a commentary on this case but it certainly seemed to lend weight to the judge's decision. I'm not aware of the exact specifics here, but I imagine that this was a missed opportunity for the Constitution to be re-interpreted in its stipulations. Let us consider for a moment the definition of endorsement: "to give value to something". This something can be a cause or a commodity, for example. "I endorse Ron Paul for 2012!" "I endorse the iPod touch!" It's possible to refrain from endorsing something yet still recognize that it possesses value in some form. However, endorsing it necessarily elevates its status over other causes or commodities.
Consider then, that the promotion of religion isn't 'promotion' merely by the passive display of a prayer banner in a school. It thus does not qualify government endorsement or the establishment of religion. This has already been explained. It cannot be endorsement if there is no political community from which an individual can be excluded from as a consequence. If an individual is excluded from a subgroup which they do not identify with (like Christianity), then their non-participation is of no consequence.
The core of my argument rests on the definition of "endorsement", in relation to the Constitutional amendment which states that no law shall be passed respecting the establishment of religion. This is where it gets technical.
To set religious preconditions for participation in school activities implies that religion (in particular, deism) is inherently superior to other positions that may be taken, which are not useful in gauging an individual's ability to participate in the community. For example, just because you are Muslim doesn't mean you cannot play soccer. These preconditions imply that religion possesses an inherent quality which makes it favorable as a reliable measure of individual worth in this vein.
Thus, those who are not eligible to participate due to this single pre-condition do not have sufficient worth to fulfill their roles as members of the community, regardless of other qualifications they may possess.
To elevate the status of deism to the point where it is used an instrument of segregation based on this presupposition of inherent worth necessarily promotes (increases the value of) that brand of deism, since it otherwise has no use (and thus no value) in determining who or who may not participate in the school community.
It follows since that no religion has necessarily been promoted at this school (that we know of in this vein), that no part of the Constitution has necessarily been violated. Hence, the girl has no case in compelling the school to take down the poster, since it has not been used as an instrument of segregation.
I'll note that citing the Constitution when defending the decision is an appeal to authority. That the court decision sought to toe in line with the Constitution does not automatically justify it. There are several instances where the Constitution was struck down for the better. One example is the institution of slavery; that was abolished via a Constitutional amendment. The Constitution is not an infallible document, and care should be taken to realize opportunities for improvements to be made to it when they arise in the interests of better serving the people whom are subject to its stipulations.
Considering the above, what is secularism? It is the abolishment of theism as a tool for social stratification -- the only area in which theism's value can be promoted. It's perceived 'promotion' elsewhere, where it is closer to passive exclusion rather than active segregation, is not grounds for 'secularism'.
This is interpreted by some to mean that no national Church (as is the case with the Church of England in England) is to be established. It's more broadly construed by others still to mean that the government has no business pushing religious beliefs on its people (see: teaching creationism in public schools et. al). This is the view taken by some leftists. It also seems to be the view of proclaimed atheist Jessica Ahlquist, who was asked to serve as a plaintiff in the lawsuit against her school by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).3
What was the issue at hand? Ahlquist's school, Cranston West, had a prayer banner displayed on its walls. Since Cranston West is a public school, it follows that it shouldn't be allowed to display religious messages because it would be non-secular, right? Wrong. The display of a religious banner inside a public school does not qualify as non-secularism. Let us refer to a 1984 Supreme Court case on which the judge of this case used as a partial basis for his decision. The issue in this case was whether or not the inclusion of a Nativity scene violated the Establishment clause.4 In its decision, the Court ruled:
[T]he crèche is a passive representation of religion and there was "insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the crèche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious" view.If there was lacking evidence proving that the local government was espousing a certain religious view, the claim that the display violates the Establishment clause is not so easily forwarded. On this basis, Judge Lageux, the justice presiding over Ahlquist v. Cranston, ruled that the school violated the Establishment clause because there was evidence of direct government promotion of religion involved. But hold on! He partially based his decision on Lynch v. Donnelly (1984). In a Judge's concurring opinion on the case, she stated:
[G]overnment endorsement [of religion] ... sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.Referring back to the prayer banner displayed in Cranston West, I ask you to consider how the banner could have signified a political divide if there was little to no active segregation of the student body concerning individual participation in the school community. If there is necessarily a community to be excluded from, the only relevant body to consider is the student body, of which the exclusion from such a cohesive constitutes the promotion of religion.
The usage of the term "political community" suggests a realm of constituents who possess exclusive access to means with which they can affect the political process of the wider school community. That means that their participation has greater weight than a non-adherent. But if individual participation in the school community is equal, then what power is conferred to the individual who happens to be 'favored'? What is 'favoritism' if there is no community to be favored into? Further, if there is no favoritism, how can the promotion of religion be justified in this case?
There is no 'political' community because the display of such a banner has not warranted the creation of such a political divide. The banner has played no significant role in determining who may or may not participate as full members of the school community. To even bring politics into an educational setting in this case is absurd.
This is not about the balance of power between individuals in the decision making process affecting the school community or the principles which lend weight to that power and hence shape subsequent relations ... there is no politics involved in this case. The only community that could be considered 'political' by this definition is the student council or some equivalent, and in most schools, it's merely a figure-head with no real influence in deciding how the school is ran.
I am aware that the above is not a commentary on this case but it certainly seemed to lend weight to the judge's decision. I'm not aware of the exact specifics here, but I imagine that this was a missed opportunity for the Constitution to be re-interpreted in its stipulations. Let us consider for a moment the definition of endorsement: "to give value to something". This something can be a cause or a commodity, for example. "I endorse Ron Paul for 2012!" "I endorse the iPod touch!" It's possible to refrain from endorsing something yet still recognize that it possesses value in some form. However, endorsing it necessarily elevates its status over other causes or commodities.
Consider then, that the promotion of religion isn't 'promotion' merely by the passive display of a prayer banner in a school. It thus does not qualify government endorsement or the establishment of religion. This has already been explained. It cannot be endorsement if there is no political community from which an individual can be excluded from as a consequence. If an individual is excluded from a subgroup which they do not identify with (like Christianity), then their non-participation is of no consequence.
The core of my argument rests on the definition of "endorsement", in relation to the Constitutional amendment which states that no law shall be passed respecting the establishment of religion. This is where it gets technical.
To set religious preconditions for participation in school activities implies that religion (in particular, deism) is inherently superior to other positions that may be taken, which are not useful in gauging an individual's ability to participate in the community. For example, just because you are Muslim doesn't mean you cannot play soccer. These preconditions imply that religion possesses an inherent quality which makes it favorable as a reliable measure of individual worth in this vein.
Thus, those who are not eligible to participate due to this single pre-condition do not have sufficient worth to fulfill their roles as members of the community, regardless of other qualifications they may possess.
To elevate the status of deism to the point where it is used an instrument of segregation based on this presupposition of inherent worth necessarily promotes (increases the value of) that brand of deism, since it otherwise has no use (and thus no value) in determining who or who may not participate in the school community.
It follows since that no religion has necessarily been promoted at this school (that we know of in this vein), that no part of the Constitution has necessarily been violated. Hence, the girl has no case in compelling the school to take down the poster, since it has not been used as an instrument of segregation.
I'll note that citing the Constitution when defending the decision is an appeal to authority. That the court decision sought to toe in line with the Constitution does not automatically justify it. There are several instances where the Constitution was struck down for the better. One example is the institution of slavery; that was abolished via a Constitutional amendment. The Constitution is not an infallible document, and care should be taken to realize opportunities for improvements to be made to it when they arise in the interests of better serving the people whom are subject to its stipulations.
Considering the above, what is secularism? It is the abolishment of theism as a tool for social stratification -- the only area in which theism's value can be promoted. It's perceived 'promotion' elsewhere, where it is closer to passive exclusion rather than active segregation, is not grounds for 'secularism'.
Bibliography
1. Tom Head. "Establishment Clause". About.com. Accessed February 12, 2012.
2. "Establishment Clause". Wikipedia. Accessed February 12, 2012.
3. "Ahlquist v. Cranston". Wikipedia. Accessed February 12, 2012.
4. "Lynch v. Donnelly". Wikipedia. Accessed February 12, 2012.