This time, I engage a well-read skeptic on the subject of crop circles and ET. I am '1'. He is '2'. This post will be updated as the person replies. Enjoy.
1: Hi!
I just wanted to say that I saw your thread, and I really appreciated how you persuaded others to think past ET explanations for complex structures. I didn't know residual radiation in crop could have had terrestrial sources, though it makes you question why an advanced space-faring species would use vehicles that emitted radiation if their observed effects were known to be harmful.
Anyhow, I wanted to message you directly because the thread is kinda old for any response by this point (unless you check it regularly, I suppose). My question to you is regards the Julia set crop formation. You may have heard of it. Is it possible for such a formation to have been produced within the 45 minute time frame by human agency? It was not reported to have been in the field at 5:30pm that morning, and was first reported at 6:15. I cannot find a source for this, but a guard from across Stonehenge glanced toward the field twice in a fifteen minute time frame, and when he glanced the second time, he saw the formation. There are two potential time-frames to work with.
What are your thoughts on the matter?
2: Hey there! First, that was a really nice message. Thank you! I appreciate it, and I wanted to dignify it with some time, so I jumped into this. The Julia Set crop circle isn't one I'm familiar with. I mean, I've seen it before, definitely, but I didn't know the story behind it. So I'm as fresh as can be on this one. I read the entire page you linked me to, all three articles. It's an interesting story! And a f'ing amazing crop circle. Good hell.
Assuming the pilot isn't mistaken, or fabricating for fun, the 45 minute time window is pretty insane. There's also a little part of me that's saying "You know, that time window hinges entirely on that one pilot's account. Is that enough to say it was definitely created in under 45 minutes? Am I being too unreasonable in even thinking about this?"
There were some parts that were pretty far out, like the eyewitness accounts of thick, magical mist creating the design. It seems like the only eyewitness to mention it was Lucy. But the mist, the time window, this is all secondary to how cool that thing is. That is some crazy engineering to get that down, no matter who (or what!) did it.
So then I did some Googling. Nothing biased in the search terms, just "julia set crop circle." The second over-all result was this interview with Rod Dickinson. He's the guy who's mentioned in the third article of the link you gave me. The article's author respectfully brings in alternate evidence that suggests it could be man-made. He mentions a guy named Rod Dickinson, who claims to know that it was. Could the interview be made up? Sure, but so could some of the Julia Set details, too, since both the accounts and the interview have about the same amount of authenticity to their evidence.
Now, this is all under the assumption that there's an agreement between us that the Julia Set crop circle could be designed and made by humans. If you're of the belief, instead, that it's too elegant and massive to have been made by humans, then it's a much different (but equally open and hopefully enjoyable!) conversation.
So anyway, that's sort of how it runs through in my head. The crop circle is real. We definitely know that! But the rest is truly he-said/she-said, and he-said/she-said isn't enough to demonstrate that the Julia Set crop circle is of non-human origin.
(If you ask me.)
What are your thoughts?
1: Excuse my late reply! I spent three hours or so writing this. (I'm a long thinker and even slower writer.)
Thanks for responding! I admit that I'm somewhat biased toward extra-terrestrial explanations of events, provided that a sufficient amount of alternate explanations have been discounted (and I arbitrate what those terms are). I quickly linked to that article through the same search term, but I gleaned most of the background details from Whitley Strieber's book,
The Communion Enigma. I can't speak for what experiences he's had that persuaded him to accept (limited) evidence as a credible standard of evidence.
For instance, in his book he writes:
Much research, most of it on the part of Dr. Levengood, has shown that the stem nodes are heated to make them bend, and this is perfectly obvious even on casual observation. The nodes are darker and bent in flattened crop, but not in standing crop immediately beside it. But when I tried to bend standing crop, the stems broke off. Pushing at them with a board simply made more break than if I had done it by hand. (Page 109)
Yet it seems the qualities observed could be sufficiently explained by the rope-and-board hypothesis, where the nodes are blown out in felled plant stalk by downward pressure (correct me if I'm wrong; fallible memory). Residual radiation reported in recent accounts can be accounted for by the possible use of magnetrons in their production. It seems to be a novel method and, as technology progresses along new lines, the techniques for creating crop formations increase in sophistication as well. But Strieber seems to assume that humans cannot explode nodes, as they appear to be heat-induced. Indeed, he writes:
Perhaps Doug and Dave used curling irons or hair dyers. (Page 111).
That's just a short note on how my exposure to new evidence has allowed me to reconsider the validity of previously posited explanations behind crop formations.
In short, I'm open to the possibility (perhaps even probability) that the Julia set crop circle was created by humans, considering the above. So there's an agreement between us there, at least.
What are your thoughts?
My perspective on this matter broadly concerns itself with standards of evidence which are in continuous conflict with what constitutes evidence and knowledge. It's more philosophical than factually based, I suppose. I should disclose that I'm not entirely convinced by certain skeptical arguments for the sake of being skeptical. Insufficient evidence exists to unquestionably confirm the ET hypothesis, on principle. Yet, naturalistic or mundane postulations cannot entirely account for strong anomalies in tabulated data either. We posit the best explanations to fit the known evidence. It follows that most phenomena can be explained by naturalistic accounts. Stanton T. Friedman wrote in his book,
Top Secret/Majic that:
Project Blue Book Special Report 14 demonstrates that 21.5 percent of the 3201 [UFO] sightings investigated could not be identified, completely separate from the 9.5 percent which were labeled insufficient information. The probability that the Unknowns were just missed Knowns was shown to be less than one percent. It was found that the better the quality of the sighting, the more likely it was to be an Unknown. It is clear that the combination of appearance and incredible flight behavior rule out an earth origin for pre-1955 Unknown sightings.
'Unknowns' doesn't mean that the phenomena observed were intelligently controlled craft, of course. But given that the probability of those being missed Knowns was small, it seems unlikely that some other as of-yet undiscovered terrestrial phenomena could account for these sightings. Based on the anomalies tabulated, we can't conclude
definitively that ET exist, but that the best remaining hypothesis which account for these Unknowns are intelligently controlled craft/ET. Until a likely naturalistic alternative is posited, it seems that ET is the best hypothesis for these Unknown observations. That is the attitude that reputable ET researchers have concerning standards of evidence (not to say I am one).
Now, in terms of this Julia set case ... to broaden the horizon, if you like.
I think this case illustrates that over-reliance on witness accounts is not a substitute for genuine inquiry. Humans, in terms of recollections of past events at least, are very susceptible to cognitive biases which color the reproduction of accounts, and can lead to conflicting witness statements. Though I think I understand the frustration between the skeptics and believers. It boils down to an acceptable standard of evidence, and the will to research outcomes which conflict with your reigning outlook when scheming a fruitful discourse.
There are stumbling blocks on this path which need to be addressed. If you're exposed to information about a particular event, you're more likely to draw upon that information if it seemed sufficient on its own at the time, which is reliant on several factors (I believe that's an example of confirmation bias). The argument is logically valid, but factually incorrect. This works best with uninformed people. I use the following cases as illustrative analogies of the present situation, they are not literally how
It seems people posit certain 'working' assumptions (read: they
appear to work) when uninformed about certain observed events. This is drawn through inductive logic. "All of the swans that all living beings have ever seen are white. Therefore, all swans are white." This is valid on a logical level, but it falls apart when we see a black swan. We then amend the first statement to read: "Not all swans are white." It's an a posteriori statement which is informally true.
The assumptions posited appear to be reliant on the observed evidence. It's thus possible for us to posit more realistic assumptions about reality as we're exposed to new verifiable information. In fact, this process is central to scientific research. There are several ways to obtain information apart from personal observation which remain within the realm of naturalist empiricism. I can't directly compare assumptions drawn from personal observation and the systemic assumptions which ground empirical science, of course. But discourse fundamentally occurs on an individual level.
This assumption-positing becomes problematic
on an individual level, because a skilled propagandist can exclude conflicting information to produce a sanitized argument which
appears logical (through inductive logic) when examined on the surface. Yet, it dissipates when someone with
particular knowledge (experience in a discipline or even basic research) scrutinizes it. However, particular knowledge is by definition uncommon, so inductive logic cannot be held as a standard when examining evidence.
This issue could be rooted in how we interpret declarative statements. If I point to a photo of President Kennedy, alive and well in the photo, and I say "This is a photo of a dead person", would that be a true statement? Informally, it is true, because people are generally aware of Kennedy's death. Death is retroactively applied (it must be; we are drawing upon the past [this person has
died] to speak about the present [the is a photo
of...] The active subject is also changed; instead of talking about the person, we are discussing what the photo
itself represents, as per the sentence syntax. But people usually parse the syntax to mean the person subject itself is what's being referred to.
Nonetheless, the statement makes the silent implication that the observer retains
factual knowledge of Kennedy's death, and can thus deductively draw that conclusion. But on a logical level, excluding these underlying cognitive assumptions, the statement asserts unqualified information (it is insufficient to conclude either outcome). Without particular assumptions of certain knowledge to qualify propositions, we cannot judge the truth-value of particular statements.
How does this tie in with standards of evidence when scrutinizing claims? Declarative statements make particular assumptions about factual knowledge, as we have seen. It follows that naturalistic explanations, as a set of hypotheses containing qualitatively true (by virtue of experiment) observations expressed as statements, make particular, possibly incorrect assumptions regards factual knowledge.
This raises the issue of what constitutes declarative knowledge and how it develops over time. Is it a social phenomenon? In my view, I'm inclined to think it is, as I have demonstrated how one can be left stranded when not privy to it. If it's a social phenomenon, it must be because declarative knowledge transfers between people, and can be independently verified on a mutual standard of evidence.
In the confirmation bias scenario, factual knowledge exists but is excluded from logical argument. It can be satisfactorily concluded by the observer, thanks to the exclusion of these facts, that the argument is valid. But it is not necessarily true. Even if the facts were presented accordingly, it remains a logically valid argument. Yet it can be overturned in the face of compelling evidence when it comes to what is likely to be true. If compelling evidence can demonstrate a greater likelihood of ET intelligence existing than not, then it seems skeptical arguments which rely on naturalistic explanations which, either by design, ignorance, or on purpose, fail to account for/ignore these same anomalies that would decimate those arguments.
In short, agreeing upon a standard of evidence is tough, not least because of how, in the absence of physical evidence of these phenomena (e.g. space vehicles), skeptics resort to naturalistic explanations which cannot account for true anomalies. This seems to be done in part because naturalism has large weight afforded to it already, and because UFO researchers have an increased burden to determine for the benefit of both parties what is acceptable and relevant evidence to pass scrutiny. As Friedman contends:
Friedman argues that reproducibility is largely irrelevant to the study of UFOs, essentially because by definition, scientists do not control variables if UFO phenomena involve intelligent extraterrestrial control; that is, in this case, the study of UFOs does not involve experiment and experimental methods. This position can be criticized on the basis that experiments can be conducted on materials or technology that are hypothesized to have an extraterrestrial origin. Although Friedman maintains that such materials have on at least one occasion been obtained, as stated above, he maintains these are highly classified and not available for conventional or mainstream scientific study.
He further notes that it would be irrational to dismiss credible witnesses as poor observers merely because they cannot identity given phenomena as conventional, or as good observers because they can. Who arbitrates this judgment, and why should it be used as a metric when falsifying evidence? Doesn't this indicate a bias toward naturalistic explanations for events which may not sufficiently account for them? This is a point to consider when deciding what explanation fits the bill best. I'm going to stop there because I realize I went off on a
loooong tangent and I apologize for that.
Those are my thoughts in the matter, explicated in full.
1: I read over my previous responses and wanted to clarify some potentially confusing points.
"Inductive reasoning".
I assume that those with no specific knowledge of a subject will be receptive to naturalistic arguments, which rely on reproducible experiments and physical evidence. If these are not qualities which can be reproduced in a laboratory environment, it must be a regular enough pattern to be tabulated and construct general principles extracted from observing consistent behavior. This is a standard of evidence that is heavily supported, with falsifiable hypotheses and whatnot. Uninformed observers use inductive logic to reach conclusions in the absence of greater evidence. In general, all scientists do.
They construct general principles from tabulated observations. I just wanted to point out that inductive reasoning is biased toward natural indicators. If there exist
anomalous observations which cannot be sufficiently accounted for by existing naturalistic explanations, then a
dishonest skeptic will rely on the
weakness of inductive reasoning to draw otherwise uninformed persons into his net of deception. I pointed out that the ET hypothesis cannot be entirely falsified because no physical evidence exists (at least publicly), but there exists enough evidence in the form of credible witnesses and high-quality sightings to not dismiss it entirely out of hand.
"The argument is logically valid, but factually incorrect. This works best with uninformed people."
I meant this as in the argument against a particular case that an uninformed person first reads, e.g. anthropogenic global warming, is logically valid but factually incorrect. The combination of these factors sows the impression that the argument holds any currency in truth, when it does
not. This is again, another example of how inductive reasoning can be exploited by dishonest skeptics who purposely exclude observations which cannot be sufficiently explained by the theories posited.
"I use the following cases as illustrative analogies of the present situation, they are not literally how"
This sentence was cut off. I use the examples of confirmation bias and the ambiguity of declarative statements which constitute broader theories to illustrate what I perceive to be the epistemic problems present in the scientific method and with people who exploit these weaknesses to stamp out legitimate inquiry into unconventional, but credible phenomena (Yet again, UFOs. It's a real pattern, but what
are they? Insufficient evidence to definitely conclude the nature of these, but the best explanation appears to be ET hypothesis, given that the anomalies of the characteristics observed cannot be sufficiently explained by the posited theories).
"If compelling evidence can demonstrate a greater likelihood of ET intelligence existing than not, then it seems skeptical arguments which rely on naturalistic explanations which, either by design, ignorance, or on purpose, fail to account for/ignore these same anomalies that would decimate those arguments."
This sentence loops on itself. I
meant to say:
"If compelling evidence can demonstrate a greater likelihood of ET intelligence existing rather than not, it seems that conventional explanations for these observations, which fail to sufficiently account for these anomalies, would be discarded or fine-tuned to fit the new evidence."
I continued discussion in a similar topic started by this person on a later date. The conversation can be found here. I enjoyed chatting with this guy. I think it made me more skeptical since I was exposed to his measured, but open-minded skepticism.
