There was a recent discussion on truth-value and the meaning conferred to it within a particular sphere of experience. It was sparked by the author's musings on the ontological value of truth. I should note that the original post was published on August 15, 2008 but the discussion dates from February 14, 2012 at the earliest.
From Atheism Analyzed:
axiom (n)
Looking back at the comment, it appears to be a fair-minded statement of fact, for the most part. The notion of a legal right implies the compulsion to deliver a particular service or protection. Compulsion is the negation of individual autonomy. Thus, the guarantee of a legal right necessarily implies the restriction of individual liberty since one is expected to deliver a particular service without his consent.
I am not sure what to think of the following comment:
It only addresses the symptoms of such a problem. Ethics is concerned with addressing the problem directly in different terms of scope, be it applied, normative or meta-ethics and consequently many positions are available for one to take in this vein. Then I suppose 'substitute' refers to the displacement of individual autonomy and ethical practice with State action in its own interests not compatible with any ethical doctrine. Perhaps I'm missing something important or I'm reading too deeply into it. Like I said, I'm not sure how to interpret the rest of this comment.
This person illustrates well the absurdities of the system in which we live. He submits to us the example of using play money to purchase goods and services in the game Monopoly. He rightly notes that the sentence 'Play money has purchasing power' is true of the sphere of experience that the game of Monopoly is confined to. Play money has value insofar as the players treat it as having such throughout the game. Likewise, real money has ostensible purchasing power insofar as there's a strong commitment to participating in a system wherein that purchasing power is valued. There is logically no distinction between how we treat either the dollar or the play money except that the former has a far greater reach and is consequently far more relevant to our lives.
Why does it have a far greater reach? Because we forget that the players abiding by the system extend 'faith and credit' to give an otherwise worthless piece of paper some utility in facilitating the flow of transactions. It is pretend money, we just forget it to be because we take it so seriously. In concluding his post, the commentator submits two final examples of 'truth':
He ends his post with this statement: "All human institutions are equally fictional [...] both of your axioms are true (in [their] relative [context]), but depending on the meaning of the word "life", they may or may not exist within exclusive illusions or fictions."
He truly has a way with words that I would struggle to express myself with the same degree of clarity. I have held these beliefs for some time but have never seen them expressed so eloquently as I have seen him done here. I agree with nearly every point expressed in that commentary.
Not to detract from the original purpose of this post, which is how one is supposed to approach the assessment of a proposition's truth-value, of which I now hope you have a clearer picture of in light of this commentary. Here's a riddle to juggle about in your mind: What is the truth-value of an illusion, if all human institutions which confer some sort of value to something, are ultimately fictional?
From Atheism Analyzed:
If free-will is axiomatic, then rights as such cannot be axiomatic because any assumed right encroaches upon the freedom of another. As far as I can tell, rights are a legal fiction which act as a substitute for a genuine ethics.The author of the original post submits the following definition for 'axiom':
axiom (n)
(1) a self-evident truth or a proposition whose truth is so evident at first sight no process of reasoning or demonstration can make it plainer; the whole is greater than a part.
(2) an established principle in some art or science; a principle received without new proof.
(3) a statement universally accepted as true; a maxim.
Webster's Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, Second Edition 1979, Simon & Schuster.This definition sounds similar to that of a truism from our previous discussion on secularism; mainly, it's a self-evident truth. Whereas in philosophy a truism relies on incomplete conditions to assess its truth value, an axiom cannot be proven within the system following particular rules of inference based on it. One proposition remains true irrespective of its context and the other is true by virtue of the context it remains in.
Looking back at the comment, it appears to be a fair-minded statement of fact, for the most part. The notion of a legal right implies the compulsion to deliver a particular service or protection. Compulsion is the negation of individual autonomy. Thus, the guarantee of a legal right necessarily implies the restriction of individual liberty since one is expected to deliver a particular service without his consent.
I am not sure what to think of the following comment:
Rights [...] act as a substitute for genuine ethics.Legal protections are indeed a fiction, but how do they necessarily 'substitute' for 'genuine' ethics? I suppose the designation of 'genuine' refers to ethical approaches that retain practical meaning when removed from the subjectivity that dominates an enclosed sphere of experience. True ethics cannot attach itself to an impermanent actor if it wishes be applied meaningfully. The issuance of rights does not address the cause behind such transgression that necessitates protection against undue force.
It only addresses the symptoms of such a problem. Ethics is concerned with addressing the problem directly in different terms of scope, be it applied, normative or meta-ethics and consequently many positions are available for one to take in this vein. Then I suppose 'substitute' refers to the displacement of individual autonomy and ethical practice with State action in its own interests not compatible with any ethical doctrine. Perhaps I'm missing something important or I'm reading too deeply into it. Like I said, I'm not sure how to interpret the rest of this comment.
This person illustrates well the absurdities of the system in which we live. He submits to us the example of using play money to purchase goods and services in the game Monopoly. He rightly notes that the sentence 'Play money has purchasing power' is true of the sphere of experience that the game of Monopoly is confined to. Play money has value insofar as the players treat it as having such throughout the game. Likewise, real money has ostensible purchasing power insofar as there's a strong commitment to participating in a system wherein that purchasing power is valued. There is logically no distinction between how we treat either the dollar or the play money except that the former has a far greater reach and is consequently far more relevant to our lives.
Why does it have a far greater reach? Because we forget that the players abiding by the system extend 'faith and credit' to give an otherwise worthless piece of paper some utility in facilitating the flow of transactions. It is pretend money, we just forget it to be because we take it so seriously. In concluding his post, the commentator submits two final examples of 'truth':
Both of the following are true:
"Monopoly money will buy you Monopoly property."
"A dollar will buy you a pack of gum."He goes on to state that if we were to divorce these propositions from the contexts which delineate them, and replace them into an absolute context, there would be no difference between the two propositions ontologically as both are meaningless in actuality. He rightly notes that it's the fictions that humans breathe life into that in turn gives these propositions some meaning that reflects what humans see as having utility.
He ends his post with this statement: "All human institutions are equally fictional [...] both of your axioms are true (in [their] relative [context]), but depending on the meaning of the word "life", they may or may not exist within exclusive illusions or fictions."
He truly has a way with words that I would struggle to express myself with the same degree of clarity. I have held these beliefs for some time but have never seen them expressed so eloquently as I have seen him done here. I agree with nearly every point expressed in that commentary.
Not to detract from the original purpose of this post, which is how one is supposed to approach the assessment of a proposition's truth-value, of which I now hope you have a clearer picture of in light of this commentary. Here's a riddle to juggle about in your mind: What is the truth-value of an illusion, if all human institutions which confer some sort of value to something, are ultimately fictional?
