Ayn Rand's Objectivism

I heard of Ayn Rand before I read Virtue of Selfishness. I knew that her philosophy dealt with ethics and metaphysics. I also knew that she used it as a front to promote laissez-faire capitalism. To that end, I don't see it as a genuine political philosophy, but rather an intellectually shallow pseudo-philosophy tempered by Cold War paranoia and excessive capitalist romanticism. Glancing over her definitions and insight into the terms, she demonstrates a crude understanding of history, yet invests considerable insight into her moral philosophy. That said, it's not strictly a unique concept. No new modes of thought have been introduced. It's a quilt sewn together from previously existing concepts. Then she slapped a label on it and said "Yay! It's mine!"

There are several conditions Rand assumes in her (numerous) arguments. I will only address a few topics which are of interest to me.

Chapter 14: The Nature of Government


In chapter twelve, Rand opens by stating that a 'truly free' society must be consistent with the notion of individual rights. In this context, 'truly free' serves as a handy euphemism for laissez-faire capitalism. Rand argues that only this brand of capitalism can best exercise individual rights, because it incentivize persons to act in what she claims to be their 'rational self-interest', which is some sort of compromise between arbitrarily fulfilling each petty whim and acting out of selfless concern. In chapter fourteen, Rand asserts that the only entity mortgaged to enforce the protection of these rights is a state to which the governed express consent, and, in turn, to which statecraft is subordinated. 


The author assumed that since this hierarchal structure was brought about my 'democratic' activity, it's necessarily democratic (i.e. decentralized and subsumed to the interests of the governed). Her naiveté is precious. A monopoly on force is required to preserve a democratic society; this is what she fundamentally asserts. You can see that the two notions contradict one another. Further, the polity she illustrates ostensibly resembles a democracy, but constituents are systemically excluded from the majority of the political process. The best the masses can hope for is to ratify pre-formulated policy decisions. Other than that, public involvement in state affairs is extremely limited. This is representative democracy, and, the sort Rand appends to her philosophical praxis.

One crucial assumption Rand makes is that a government is necessarily statist. I will be loose in my usage of the term here since views on what a 'State' is are wide and varied. It spans a range of political phenomena that in one way or another involves a monopoly on the usage of force. It matters not under what conditions a state claims legitimacy; that's not my concern, be it democratic or monarchist. Her assumption can be contradicted very easily. In popular vernacular, government is understood to mean 'state': the two are interchangeable. Yet self-government is also a form of government. When I speak of self-government, I refer to voluntary association, a concept which figures prominently in socialist literature, and distorted by right-'libertarians'. Individuals band together under free agreement to realize goals of common interest to them. This implies that political interest is decentralized and directly controlled as opposed to being appropriated by illegitimate monopolies.

A 'democratic' State, say Canada, claims its legitimacy on an ahistorical basis known as the 'social contract', the one proposed by John Locke as a thought experiment (his aim was to frame discussion on this basis from which future societies could possibly arise). The modern-day democratic state defines the 'public interest' on this basis, which serves as a convenient surrogate for private elite interests. Even the outcome of policy which incidentally coincides with this stated aim is an epiphenomenon of the mechanisms which underlie the democratic framework. Larger democracies rely on public goods (i.e. 'good policy') to obtain and remain in power. Nominal democracies such as North Korea offer a limited array of mechanisms, both in number and scope, to manage state affairs at the popular level, whilst remaining beholden to private interests, extinguishing the need for 'good policy' since private interests are secured at the expense of the public.

This is not to say that democracies are as equally despicable as dictatorships. The binary classifications of the 'realist' school of international relations simply fail to capture then nuances between differing 'democracies' and fail to highlight the similarities between how a 'dictatorship' and a 'democracy' function. Suffice it to say, I have no illusions that our government is as publicly accountable as most think it to be. I recommend The Dictator's Handbook for a in-depth explanation of this issue. In fact, the theory propounded by the book serves as a viable alternative to the realist school of thought, and can account not only for how states function, but even corporations and charities.

There are several shortfalls I've alluded to which undermine the liberatory potential of a democratic conception of statism. You elect a hand-picked (he's elected by the party) once over a period of time. He's not immediately recallable. In order to kick him out office, you have to wait a few years. He doesn't sufficiently represent the public interest, but as we've seen, this is a moo t point since the public interest is farcical at best. He has  a platform on which you elect him. You can't adopt one policy without accepting another. There's no guarantee that anyone of your preferred policy will be acted upon, and if so, executed sufficiently to retain your loyalty. Civilians are excluded from the drafting process; they cannot review or suggest changes to proposed legislation. You cannot decide whether or not to go to war, or how to allocate spending. This public overview substituted with that handy euphemism, the 'public interest'. These are just some of the issues present with 'representative' democracy.

Finally, I don't think the right to the initiation of force necessarily underpins all conception of government (which disqualifies statism). I should note that the model Rand proposes is hierarchical since only one entity has the right to the means of force. This creates social relationships based around the usage of force, contrary to what Rand wishes to accomplish. There are several means besides the initiation of force which can be used to diffuse tensions peacefully. I understand that the purpose behind retributive punishment is to enforce normative expectations (those which underlie the societal framework). I believe this approach is excessive. If, as Rand asserts, man's highest faculty is reason, he should be predisposed to using reason and dialogue to resolve disputes. Force is a possible choice, but should it remain the focal point to which justice is subordinated?

Rand ignores the social relationships that capitalism (especially laissez-faire) creates. The relation of wage-labor means that labor is ceaselessly subjugated to private capital. Workers are coerced into selling their labor-power for pittance whilst the capitalist can hire additional wage-slaves from the expropriated surplus. The socialist would thus disagree with Rand that capitalism entails freedom for this very reason.

This criticism forms the core tenet of socialism which advocates worker's control of the means of production (factories, tools, etc.). The profound disadvantage to laissez-faire capitalism can be summed up as state-sanctioned monopoly on the means of life (tools for labor, recreation and expression) to the extreme.

I oppose this brand of capitalism because it unfairly raises dependency on the means of life, which are involuntarily used. In order to continue living, we continuously expend our resources (e.g. earn wage to purchase necessities from a commodity market, earned through labor power), which requires usage of the means of life, but since it's oriented toward profit in a capitalist society, the process is alienation (from labor product, other workers, the labor process, so forth) as opposed to fulfillment. 

Individuals in a socialist society would have more recreational time available since a large portion isn't concentrated into selling your labor-power for someone else's benefit. The portrait painted by right-“libertarians” is an idealistic caricature of capitalism as a given number of individuals freely agreeing to trade resources. This, ironically, captures the essence of truly free-market interactions as opposed to merely capitalist ones which claim to be free-market. The situation is complex; I won't reproduce it here for sake of brevity. Suffice it to say that right-“libertarians” and other capitalist apologists are living off in a romantic dream world which never was. In short, I think Ayn Rand is delusional.

Chapter 12: Man’s Rights

Rand opines about what principles constitute a “right”, who/what can protect them, and how such rights can be applied. The author correctly asserts that the issuance of rights implies an obligation. Because ‘collectivist’ rights (like “the right of every family to a decent home”) are altruistic, she reasons, they are tantamount to slave labor. Fair enough, though I think the comparison is a tad dramatic.

She writes:

“The right to life means that a man has the right to support his life by his own work (on any economic level, as high as his ability will carry him).” I would add that individuals can co-operate in the labor process, too. It's not an obligation, but a contract formed under free agreement. 

“The right to property means that a man has the right to take the economic actions necessary to earn property, to use it and to dispose of it; it does not mean that others must provide him with property.” I disagree with the first statement. It's very vague in what constitutes the concept of 'property' and how one 'earns' it. Is my T-shirt property, or is it a possession? 'Dispose' of under what conditions? What constitutes disposal (destroying it, relinquishing it)? It doesn't follow that if I 'own' some property that I can use it however I like. If I build a play center in a vine-yard, is that the most efficient use of the grounds, or is it better suited toward harvesting? There are practical as well as political aspects to this issue. 

Now this chapter is interesting because it concentrates a robust, individualistic focus on economic rights. Right-“libertarians” and other conservatives profess a naïve account of rugged self-sufficiency, as illustrated by Rand here. I read a response by someone far more articulate than myself in this instance when he wrote: “[I]n every case, individuals are preceded by other communities […] Rugged, self-sufficient individuals, to the extent that such people actually exist, come out of skilled and supportive communities that foster these skills and capabilities. They don't spring out of the ground fully formed, nor do they invent themselves whole-cloth such that they owe 'nothing' to their social environments.”

The point is well-illustrated. It's touching to think that even a newborn is an important 'individual', but realistically, they have not yet developed preferences, skills, talents and interests that would meaningfully distinguish them from another newborn. These particular sets are attained through self-discovery and nurtured by supportive communities (friends, teachers, parents etc). 

The whole spiel about how universal health-care (for instance) is evil, because socialism is scientifically proven not to work. We even see apes -- our closest cousins -- imposing private property laws and exploiting workers. It's a bit silly, no? Conservatives (the far-right ones) rely on the romantics of 'individualism' to the extreme to argue against, well, anything remotely beneficial for the population. Ron Paul is a pretty good example of this. As much as I respect him, his assumptions about reality are questionable. In his mind, only the government is capable of committing discriminatory acts, for some reason. If it's in the private sector, deal with it. 

To quote an article on the subject (see footnote), “a libertarian by definition opposes discrimination because libertarians oppose the state. [Ron Paul] cannot imagine social power exerting itself through any other form.” I'm certain that's the driving reason behind why he's opposed to the Civil Rights Act (he claims the anti-segregation clause infringes on individual freedoms because it's government-sanctioned integration. It sounds reasonable until you realize other social forces outside the state can infringe on liberties). 

You can see, then, how taking a certain concept too far can distort critical thinking (especially if the concept in question precludes it in its configuration). This is precisely where Rand fails in her assessment of individual rights. That’s a minor criticism of Rand, too. I haven't even begun to cover the problem of capitalist property rights, which I won’t expand on for sake of brevity. That's a topic for another time. 

Footnotes

Jonathan Chait. “How Ron Paul’s Libertarian Principles Support Racism”.

http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/01/how-ron-pauls-libertarianism-supports-racism.html

January 2, 2012. New York Magazine. Retrieved May 23, 2012.

Commentary on the Discussion of Truth Value

There was a recent discussion on truth-value and the meaning conferred to it within a particular sphere of experience. It was sparked by the author's musings on the ontological value of truth. I should note that the original post was published on August 15, 2008 but the discussion dates from February 14, 2012 at the earliest.

From Atheism Analyzed:

If free-will is axiomatic, then rights as such cannot be axiomatic because any assumed right encroaches upon the freedom of another. As far as I can tell, rights are a legal fiction which act as a substitute for a genuine ethics.

The author of the original post submits the following definition for 'axiom':
           
              axiom (n)

(1) a self-evident truth or a proposition whose truth is so evident at first sight no process of reasoning or demonstration can make it plainer; the whole is greater than a part.

(2) an established principle in some art or science; a principle received without new proof.

(3) a statement universally accepted as true; a maxim.

Webster's Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, Second Edition 1979, Simon & Schuster. 

This definition sounds similar to that of a truism from our previous discussion on secularism; mainly, it's a self-evident truth. Whereas in philosophy a truism relies on incomplete conditions to assess its truth value, an axiom cannot be proven within the system following particular rules of inference based on it. One proposition remains true irrespective of its context and the other is true by virtue of the context it remains in.

Looking back at the comment, it appears to be a fair-minded statement of fact, for the most part. The notion of a legal right implies the compulsion to deliver a particular service or protection. Compulsion is the negation of individual autonomy. Thus, the guarantee of a legal right necessarily implies the restriction of individual liberty since one is expected to deliver a particular service without his consent.

I am not sure what to think of the following comment:

Rights [...] act as a substitute for genuine ethics.

Legal protections are indeed a fiction, but how do they necessarily 'substitute' for 'genuine' ethics? I suppose the designation of 'genuine' refers to ethical approaches that retain practical meaning when removed from the subjectivity that dominates an enclosed sphere of experience. True ethics cannot attach itself to an impermanent actor if it wishes be applied meaningfully. The issuance of rights does not address the cause behind such transgression that necessitates protection against undue force.

It only addresses the symptoms of such a problem. Ethics is concerned with addressing the problem directly in different terms of scope, be it applied, normative or meta-ethics and consequently many positions are available for one to take in this vein. Then I suppose 'substitute' refers to the displacement of individual autonomy and ethical practice with State action in its own interests not compatible with any ethical doctrine. Perhaps I'm missing something important or I'm reading too deeply into it. Like I said, I'm not sure how to interpret the rest of this comment.

This person illustrates well the absurdities of the system in which we live. He submits to us the example of using play money to purchase goods and services in the game Monopoly. He rightly notes that the sentence 'Play money has purchasing power' is true of the sphere of experience that the game of Monopoly is confined to. Play money has value insofar as the players treat it as having such throughout the game. Likewise, real money has ostensible purchasing power insofar as there's a strong commitment to participating in a system wherein that purchasing power is valued. There is logically no distinction between how we treat either the dollar or the play money except that the former has a far greater reach and is consequently far more relevant to our lives.

Why does it have a far greater reach? Because we forget that the players abiding by the system extend 'faith and credit' to give an otherwise worthless piece of paper some utility in facilitating the flow of transactions. It is pretend money, we just forget it to be because we take it so seriously. In concluding his post, the commentator submits two final examples of 'truth':

Both of the following are true:

"Monopoly money will buy you Monopoly property."

"A dollar will buy you a pack of gum."

He goes on to state that if we were to divorce these propositions from the contexts which delineate them, and replace them into an absolute context, there would be no difference between the two propositions ontologically as both are meaningless in actuality. He rightly notes that it's the fictions that humans breathe life into that in turn gives these propositions some meaning that reflects what humans see as having utility.

He ends his post with this statement: "All human institutions are equally fictional [...] both of your axioms are true (in [their] relative [context]), but depending on the meaning of the word "life", they may or may not exist within exclusive illusions or fictions."

He truly has a way with words that I would struggle to express myself with the same degree of clarity. I have held these beliefs for some time but have never seen them expressed so eloquently as I have seen him done here. I agree with nearly every point expressed in that commentary.

Not to detract from the original purpose of this post, which is how one is supposed to approach the assessment of a proposition's truth-value, of which I now hope you have a clearer picture of in light of this commentary. Here's a riddle to juggle about in your mind: What is the truth-value of an illusion, if all human institutions which confer some sort of value to something, are ultimately fictional?

What Is Secularism?

It is the abolishment of theism as a tool for social segregation. Similarly, a secular institution will not respect the establishment of any belief system for this reason. However, it's popularly understood as a "wall of separation between Church and State".¹ In the Constitution of the United States, the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion".²

This is interpreted by some to mean that no national Church (as is the case with the Church of England in England) is to be established. It's more broadly construed by others still to mean that the government has no business pushing religious beliefs on its people (see: teaching creationism in public schools et. al). This is the view taken by some leftists. It also seems to be the view of proclaimed atheist Jessica Ahlquist, who was asked to serve as a plaintiff in the lawsuit against her school by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).³

What was the issue at hand? Ahlquist's school, Cranston West, had a prayer banner displayed on its walls. Since Cranston West is a public school, it follows that it shouldn't be allowed to display religious messages because it would be non-secular, right? Wrong. The display of a religious banner inside a public school does not qualify as non-secularism. Let us refer to a 1984 Supreme Court case on which the judge of this case used as a partial basis for his decision. The issue in this case was whether or not the inclusion of a Nativity scene violated the Establishment clause.⁴ In its decision, the Court ruled:

[T]he crèche is a passive representation of religion and there was "insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the crèche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious" view. 

If there was lacking evidence proving that the local government was espousing a certain religious view, the claim that the display violates the Establishment clause is not so easily forwarded. On this basis, Judge Lageux, the justice presiding over Ahlquist v. Cranston, ruled that the school violated the Establishment clause  because there was evidence of direct government promotion of religion involved. But hold on! He partially based his decision on Lynch v. Donnelly (1984). In a Judge's concurring opinion on the case, she stated:

[G]overnment endorsement [of religion] ... sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.

Referring back to the prayer banner displayed in Cranston West, I ask you to consider how the banner could have signified a political divide if there was little to no active segregation of the student body concerning individual participation in the school community.  If there is necessarily a community to be excluded from, the only relevant body to consider is the student body, of which the exclusion from such a cohesive constitutes the promotion of religion.

The usage of the term "political community" suggests a realm of constituents who possess exclusive access to means with which they can affect the political process of the wider school community. That means that their participation has greater weight than a non-adherent. But if individual participation in the school community is equal, then what power is conferred to the individual who happens to be 'favored'? What is 'favoritism' if there is no community to be favored into? Further, if there is no favoritism, how can the promotion of religion be justified in this case?


There is no 'political' community because the display of such a banner has not warranted the creation of such a political divide. The banner has played no significant role in determining who may or may not participate as full members of the school community. To even bring politics into an educational setting in this case is absurd.

This is not about the balance of power between individuals in the decision making process affecting the school community or the principles which lend weight to that power and hence shape subsequent relations ... there is no politics involved in this case. The only community that could be considered 'political' by this definition is the student council or some equivalent, and in most schools, it's merely a figure-head with no real influence in deciding how the school is ran. 


I am aware that the above is not a commentary on this case but it certainly seemed to lend weight to the judge's decision. I'm not aware of the exact specifics here, but I imagine that this was a missed opportunity for the Constitution to be re-interpreted in its stipulations. Let us consider for a moment the definition of endorsement: "to give value to something". This something can be a cause or a commodity, for example. "I endorse Ron Paul for 2012!" "I endorse the iPod touch!" It's possible to refrain from endorsing something yet still recognize that it possesses value in some form. However, endorsing it necessarily elevates its status over other causes or commodities.

Consider then, that the promotion of religion isn't 'promotion' merely by the passive display of a prayer banner in a school. It thus does not qualify government endorsement or the establishment of religion. This has already been explained. It cannot be endorsement if there is no political community from which an individual can be excluded from as a consequence. If an individual is excluded from a subgroup which they do not identify with (like Christianity), then their non-participation is of no consequence.

The core of my argument rests on the definition of "endorsement", in relation to the Constitutional amendment which states that no law shall be passed respecting the establishment of religion. This is where it gets technical.

To set religious preconditions for participation in school activities implies that religion (in particular, deism) is inherently superior to other positions that may be taken, which are not useful in gauging an individual's ability to participate in the community. For example, just because you are Muslim doesn't mean you cannot play soccer. These preconditions imply that religion possesses an inherent quality which makes it favorable as a reliable measure of individual worth in this vein.

Thus, those who are not eligible to participate due to this single pre-condition do not have sufficient worth to fulfill their roles as members of the community, regardless of other qualifications they may possess.

To elevate the status of deism to the point where it is used an instrument of segregation based on this presupposition of inherent worth necessarily promotes (increases the value of) that brand of deism, since it otherwise has no use (and thus no value) in determining who or who may not participate in the school community.

It follows since that no religion has necessarily been promoted at this school (that we know of in this vein), that no part of the Constitution has necessarily been violated. Hence, the girl has no case in compelling the school to take down the poster, since it has not been used as an instrument of segregation.

I'll note that citing the Constitution when defending the decision is an appeal to authority. That the court decision sought to toe in line with the Constitution does not automatically justify it. There are several instances where the Constitution was struck down for the better. One example is the institution of slavery; that was abolished via a Constitutional amendment. The Constitution is not an infallible document, and care should be taken to realize opportunities for improvements to be made to it when they arise in the interests of better serving the people whom are subject to its stipulations.

Considering the above, what is secularism? It is the abolishment of theism as a tool for social stratification -- the only area in which theism's value can be promoted. It's perceived 'promotion' elsewhere, where it is closer to passive exclusion rather than active segregation, is not grounds for 'secularism'.

Bibliography

1. Tom Head. "Establishment Clause". About.com. Accessed February 12, 2012.

2. "Establishment Clause". Wikipedia. Accessed February 12, 2012.

3. "Ahlquist v. Cranston". Wikipedia. Accessed February 12, 2012. 

4. "Lynch v. Donnelly". Wikipedia. Accessed February 12, 2012. 

Blog Refutals # 1: "Bad Christian, Good Atheist"

The author of the referenced post identifies himself as "a Christian ... confronting atheism with logic and reason".

From The God Lowdown:

Atheists love to point out various evil deeds done by "Christians" or religious folk. So as much as possible, they cite examples of terrible things done in the name of God. "Look how dangerous religion is!" they say. "Imagine how much better off we'd be without religion!"

The point is fairly made. Refer to Sam Harris as a prominent example of this type of anti-religious argumentation. Though, we must be careful not to generalize. There are many atheists who don't concern themselves in religious matters, or who don't consider themselves qualified to take positions on or make judgments about theism. This goes toward painting Christians as the only victims and atheism as the principal perpetrator of anti-religious prejudice.

The author goes on to state (emphasis mine):

The basic concept of God¹ has done wonders for humanity.² The good far outweighs the bad.³ Eliminate God completely, and you eliminate several key underlying assumptions that greatly enhance and support human rights, liberty, and purpose.⁴ For instance, the basic assumption that each human is a special creation.⁵ The opposite⁶ assumption, which is promoted by evolution, is that each human is a random accident.⁷ Think about that, and analyze the implications of both viewpoints.⁸

It's nearly impossible to criticize the above paragraph without taking note of the underlying assumptions rooted in argument. We notice in the first sentence that the author links the beneficence of the mere notion of a deity¹ with the self-centered vision that His existence necessarily relates to humans and their affairs.² I admit it's rash for me to describe how the author framed his argument as self-centered, but excuse this for a lack of better word at the moment.

The author goes on to list the benefits of the belief in a Christian deity intertwined with a political-legal system (the State): human rights, liberty and purpose. In other words, the author submits that these three concepts necessarily follow from the existence of, not merely the belief in, a Christian deity. This interpretation is validated when the author later implies in the same paragraph that the "opposite assumption" necessarily invalidates the logical inference of these three concepts.⁸ By now I hope you can see a problem here.

The first problem is with logical inconsistencies in the author's usage of language. The argument unwittingly supposes that God is merely the product of a belief structure and not a reality independent of conscious human experience. In other words, it concerns itself with the idea of God, but does not necessarily assert that God exists, as we understand the term in its conventional usage. You can imagine then, why I'm confused as to how God's existence necessarily arises from the idea of itself. Even if we allow a charitable interpretation and grant that the author meant to be talking about the existence of God as his premise, it still does not follow that 'liberty' and 'purpose' extend from a belief in the Christian God.⁴

If you have even skimmed over the United States Declaration of Independence, you will notice that the document declares "these truths to be self-evident". In other words, the natural rights prescribed to all natural persons under the Constitution are classified as truisms. Here we will start delving a bit into philosophy. The term "truism" denotes a claim with such a degree of self-evidence^a that "it is hardly worth mentioning". A truism need not rely on particular conditions, as within a syllogism, to assert its truth-value; it's true by virtue of its logical form alone.

My contention is as follows, then. If the natural right of 'liberty', for example, has value self-evident in its nature (i.e. it's inherently valuable for humankind to pursue), it follows that it need not rely on external suppositions to assert its existential value. It has value in of itself. Therefore I argue that appending God as a necessary formulation is superfluous because it supposes that liberty derives its value from God ... but this supposes His existence in the first place. It also further supposes that liberty does not have value of itself because God's existence is a necessary precondition for its pursuit.

This is why these concepts are called natural rights. They exist by virtue of you existing alone. Therefore, it's self-evident that because you exist, you are free to pursue your own goals. The existence of a deity does not factor anywhere into this. It's worth noting that secularism, logic and reason arose in the eighteenth century in a period known as "The Enlightenment". The humanist notions of individual rights and liberty were not tied to any specific religious thought at the time; instead rooted in movements opposed to theism as a tool for social stratification and as a justification behind power. It's thus hard to argue that 'liberty' follows from the basic concept of God, let alone His existence. 

Confusion is bound to occur when we deal with logical inconsistencies in language. In the course of the author's argumentation, he first implied that the existence of God necessarily arises from the idea of God. He then asserted that the concept of God, and therefore his existence entails liberty without providing adequate logical proof of how this was so.

The second assumption in the argument seems to concern morality, or "good vs. bad".³ Considering the author is a Christian, is it likely that he's referring to some objective brand of morality that can be delineated by Scripture? Or is he passing judgment based on his own internal values? Further, while he is eager to list what he considers to be "good", he does not enlighten us to the "bad". I am confused as to how he can consider setbacks seeing as God is supposed to be wholly beneficent. So what is he referring to when he mentions the "bad"? I am most intrigued.

Let us tackle the next underlying assumption in the author's argument. He stated that each human is a special creation as a condition of God's existence.⁵ There are two assumptions here. The first is that this argument is anthropocentric: it assumes that human existence is relevant to the existence of God. It can be the case that God exists but has not assigned any meaningful objective for humans to achieve. The second assumption is that the "opposite" conclusion -- that God does not exist -- necessarily invalidates any human pursuit to fulfilling a life of meaning.⁶

Note that evolution is not the opposite of creationism. Rather, abiogenesis would be the opposite of creationism, since the former posits that life originated from inorganic matter as opposed to a deity.

The author's contention is false, of course. Atheists can easily create their own value systems without resorting to even a loose pursuit of 'purpose'. This flexibility confers many benefits upon the atheist. He may adopt a public set of values to conform in society whilst suppressing his internal values in cases where a conflict between his private and societal values may occur. I daresay the theist has a relative value system as well, considering many pick and choose what rules they wish to adhere to from their sacred scripture whilst rejecting others they deem anathema to a life of meaningful pursuit.

Notice that the author leaves the reader to speculate on the supposedly disastrous implications to unfold if society accepts the legitimacy of evolution as a credible scientific doctrine: that each human being is a 'random accident'.^7,8 There is a glaring problem with this assertion. The usage of the word 'accident' implies an unintended consequence. In other words, an unexpected outcome arose from the actions of an intelligent agent. Evolution, whilst unfolding in conscious organisms of varying degrees of intelligence apart, is indeed random, but not conscious of itself and thus cannot possess the minimum threshold required to formulate an intelligent action.

Unfortunately, the author takes a steeper turn into idiocy:

Likewise, there are tons of "Atheists" who don't apply Atheism properly.⁹ If you properly follow Atheism to its ultimate logical conclusion (that we are all here by accident and right/wrong is completely subjective), the sky is the limit for how selfish you can be. Why be honest? Why not cheat on your spouse? Why not neglect your kids? Why not murder, as long as you can avoid getting caught? Why not slaughter millions of Jews like Hitler did.¹⁰

First he proposes that there are many atheists who don't ... follow its doctrines properly?⁹ What? What is there to fail at atheism? It's simply the disbelief or lack of belief in a deity. Further there are degrees of atheism -- from weak atheist to strong atheism. It lacks a dogma which defines itself so strictly as Christianity does. That is, if you accept this set of beliefs, you are a Christian. You can vary on many other issues, hence why there are so many denominations of Christianity. Knowing this, it's a bit presumptuous to state that someone can practice Christianity incorrectly considering there are many ways of practicing it, yes? What makes your interpretation more valid over someone else's?

Secondly, he suggests that atheism can be 'properly' practiced, than fails to actually provide an example. Instead he says that true atheism entails selfishness which entails infidelity, familial neglect and cold-blooded murder.¹⁰  How do those actions even follow from a disbelief in God? The only point relevant to atheism is the disbelief itself! That's the one thing atheists have in common! Every other point is irrelevant!

The author's last point:

Hitler had ties to the Catholic church, yes. But was he a Christian? Of course not.¹¹ He did not apply any principles of Christianity whatsoever. 

We will not have to expend much energy refuting this point. The only requirement for one to be considered a Christian is a belief in a personal God according to the tenets of Christianity.¹¹ If you have faith that Jesus was the son of God, you are a Christian. What Hitler did or did not do after that is irrelevant -- the Bible even states^b you will be forgiven of your sins if you believe in God. No room for argument there.

That's it for the first post in my series of blog refutals. This post may be updated in the future for clarity.

Next Time: TBD

Bibliography

1-11. Dan Atkinson. July 14, 2010. Bad Christian, Good Atheist. The God Lowdown. Accessed February 4, 2012.

a. Truism. Wikipedia. Accessed February 4, 2012.

b. Mike Doe. God Will Forgive All of Your Sins. Bible Knowledge. Accessed February 4, 2012.
           

(Literally) Writing in Books

It's really annoying when people take the time to write in books that they borrowed from the library. If the book's not yours, don't write in it. Simple. It's discouraging for other people who would take out the book later because the various scribbles on the margins and over the words are distracting and take away from enjoying the literary quality of the book.

I had one dumbass' scribblings in a book I took out earlier this week. It was a chore to erase his trivial notes and incomprehensible questions ("why African-Americans no privilege in United States?") despite the book explaining exactly why that was the case. He didn't even note the relevant information necessary to comprehending the text. I saw various sentences circled, underlined, or placed in parentheses throughout the book which could have easily been removed from the equation and not would not have been detrimental to understanding the point the author of the text was attempting to convey. In other words, his attempted note-taking was completely fruitless.

 If you do write in a publicly-borrowed book (or any book you've borrowed), it's assumed that it's your book to write in. People take notes directly in books so that they may serve as a sort of complimentary guide to the text. The notes you take to facilitate comprehension of the text are yours alone since each individual has a different level of comprehension threshold to be breached in order to understand the text sufficiently. And of course, if you're paying such close attention to the text, why not actually buy the book? Then you can have it for as long as you want and do whatever you like to it. Or better yet, why not grab a separate sheet of paper and take your notes down there?

I want libraries to actively take action against people who willingly defile their books like this. They cost money and aren't meant to be scribbled on, and it's a chore to remove them from the book. Libraries should order the individuals in question to pay a fine equal to the monetary value of the book printed on the back. The individual then gets to keep the defiled work of literature, and the library can order a fresh copy for future users to borrow. Of course, the library must ensure that every user is aware of the consequences arising from defiling a book so willingly. No matter how innocent the cause may seem, it's no different from vandalism of a public facility (bolstered by the fact that said book belongs to the library).

The preventative measures, when taken appropriately, will ensure that each user has the chance to enjoy the rich literary experience the library has to offer, without having it desecrated by some assuming idiot.