Richard Dawkins Made the Worst Argument Against God in the History of Western Thought:
From 4:59 - 15:37:
"Now, the argument is jarring because the atheistic conclusion, 'Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist', just comes at you suddenly out of left field. You don't need to be a philosopher to realize that that conclusion doesn't follow from those six previous statements. In fact, if we take these six statements to be premises of an argument leading to the conclusion 'Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist', then Dawkins' argument is patently invalid. There are simply no logical rules of inference that would permit you to deduce this conclusion from those six premises.
So perhaps a more charitable interpretation of this argument would be to take these six statements not as premises of an argument leading to a conclusion, but perhaps just as summary statements in Dawkins' cumulative argument for his conclusion that God does not exist. But even on this more charitable construal, it still doesn't follow that the conclusion 'therefore God does not exist', can be derived from those six statements, even if we concede that each one of those statements is true and justified.
What does follow from the six steps of Dawkins' argument? Well, at most, all that follows from these six statements is that we should not infer God's existence based upon the appearance of design in the Universe. It's basically an argument against a design inference as a basis for one's belief in God. But that conclusion, of course, is quite compatible with God's existence, and even with justified belief in God.
Maybe we should believe in God on the basis of the Cosmological Argument, or the Ontological Argument, or the Moral Argument for God's existence. Maybe our belief in God isn't based on arguments at all. Maybe it's based on religious experience or divine revelation, or maybe God wants us to believe in Him simply by faith. Now, the point is, that rejecting design arguments for God's existence does absolutely nothing to prove that God does not exist, or that belief in God is not justified. In fact, historically, a great many Christian theologians have rejected arguments for the existence of God without thereby committing themselves to atheism.
So Dawkins' argument for atheism is a failure, it seems to me, even if we grant that all six of its steps are true. But moreover, I think several of these steps are plausibly false. In steps Five and Six, what he's talking about there is the discovery over the last forty years or so of the incredible fine-tuning of the Universe for intelligent life. It's been discovered by physicists that the initial conditions simply given in the Big Bang are fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent life with a complexity and delicacy that literally defy human comprehension.
And these cannot be explained in evolutionary terms because these are initial conditions. And so Five and Six is just expressing a hope that perhaps someday, we will be able to come up with some sort of theory that will be able to explain the fine-tuning of the Universe for intelligent life. I want to be speaking more about that a bit this evening, but I'll just leave that point aside this morning.
Take Step 3, for example. 'Step Three: The Temptation is a false one.' That is, the temptation to infer design, that is because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. Now, Dawkins' claim here in Step 3, that you\re not justified in inferring design as the best explanation, the complex order of the Universe, because then a new problem arises: namely, who designed the designer?
It seems to me however, that this rejoinder is flawed in at least two ways. First of all, in order to realize that an explanation is the best one, you don't need to have an explanation for the explanation. In order to realize that an explanation is the best, you don't need to have an explanation of the explanation. This is an elementary point in the Philosophy of Science concerning inference to the best explanation.
For example, if archaeologists digging in the earth were to come across artifacts resembling hatchet heads, pottery shards and arrow heads, they would be justified in inferring that these were the products of some unknown group of people, rather than the chance results of a processes of sedimentation and metamorphosis, even if they had no explanation whatsoever for who this unknown people group were or how they came to be there.
Similarly, if astronauts were to find a pile of machinery on the dark side of the moon, they would be justified in inferring that this was the product of intelligent design, even if they had no idea whatsoever who manufactured this machinery and how it came to be there. In order to recognize that an explanation is the best, you don't have to have an explanation of the explanation.
In fact, requiring that immediately launches you into an infinite regress, right? So that nothing could ever be explained, and science would be destroyed. So, oddly enough, Dawkins is enunciating a principle here which would be destructive of natural science itself. So, in the case at hand, in order to recognize that Intelligent Design is the best explanation of the appearance of design in the Universe, you don't need to be able to explain the designer.
But second point. Dawkins thinks that in the case of a divine designer, the designer is just as complex as the thing to be explained, so that no explanatory advance is made in postulating such a designer. Now this objection raises all sorts of interesting questions about the role played by simplicity in assessing competing explanations.
For example, how is simplicity to be weighted, in comparison to other criteria for theory assessment? Like explanatory power, explanatory scope, degree of ad hoc-ness, and so forth. The fact is that many times in science, we may prefer a theory that is less simple because it has greater explanatory power or greater explanatory scope. It requires to skill to weigh the different factors in theory assessment against one another in order to arrive at the best explanation. You can't always simply go with the simplest explanation. But leave those questions aside for this morning.
I think Dawkins' fundamental mistake lies in his assumption that a divine designer is an entity which is comparable in complexity to the Universe. He thinks that the designer is just as, or more complex, than the Universe itself, and it seems to me that this is patently false. As an unembodied mind, God is a remarkably simple entity.
As a non-physical entity, a mind is not composed of parts, and its salient properties like self-consciousness, rationality, volition, are essential to it. In contrast, to the contingent and variegated Universe with all of its inexplicable quantities and constance. In contrast to that, a divine mind is startlingly simple. It is an uncomposed spiritual or mental substance or entity that has no physical parts whatsoever.
Now certainly, a mind may have complex ideas, it might be thinking of infinitesimal calculus, this morning, for example. But the mind itself is a remarkable simple entity. Dawkins has evidently confused a mind's ideas, which may indeed be very complex, with the mind itself, which is a remarkable simple entity. Therefore, postulating a divine mind behind the variegating and complex Universe most definitely does represent an advance in simplicity, whatever that is worth.
So it seems to me that Step 3's argument is patently false and therefore the argument again collapses even if it were valid in the first place. Other steps in Dawkins' argument I think are also problematic, but I think enough has been said to demonstrate that this argument does absolutely nothing to undermine a design inference for a creator of the Universe, not to speak of it serving as a justification for atheism."
From 4:59 - 15:37:
"Now, the argument is jarring because the atheistic conclusion, 'Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist', just comes at you suddenly out of left field. You don't need to be a philosopher to realize that that conclusion doesn't follow from those six previous statements. In fact, if we take these six statements to be premises of an argument leading to the conclusion 'Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist', then Dawkins' argument is patently invalid. There are simply no logical rules of inference that would permit you to deduce this conclusion from those six premises.
So perhaps a more charitable interpretation of this argument would be to take these six statements not as premises of an argument leading to a conclusion, but perhaps just as summary statements in Dawkins' cumulative argument for his conclusion that God does not exist. But even on this more charitable construal, it still doesn't follow that the conclusion 'therefore God does not exist', can be derived from those six statements, even if we concede that each one of those statements is true and justified.
What does follow from the six steps of Dawkins' argument? Well, at most, all that follows from these six statements is that we should not infer God's existence based upon the appearance of design in the Universe. It's basically an argument against a design inference as a basis for one's belief in God. But that conclusion, of course, is quite compatible with God's existence, and even with justified belief in God.
Maybe we should believe in God on the basis of the Cosmological Argument, or the Ontological Argument, or the Moral Argument for God's existence. Maybe our belief in God isn't based on arguments at all. Maybe it's based on religious experience or divine revelation, or maybe God wants us to believe in Him simply by faith. Now, the point is, that rejecting design arguments for God's existence does absolutely nothing to prove that God does not exist, or that belief in God is not justified. In fact, historically, a great many Christian theologians have rejected arguments for the existence of God without thereby committing themselves to atheism.
So Dawkins' argument for atheism is a failure, it seems to me, even if we grant that all six of its steps are true. But moreover, I think several of these steps are plausibly false. In steps Five and Six, what he's talking about there is the discovery over the last forty years or so of the incredible fine-tuning of the Universe for intelligent life. It's been discovered by physicists that the initial conditions simply given in the Big Bang are fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent life with a complexity and delicacy that literally defy human comprehension.
And these cannot be explained in evolutionary terms because these are initial conditions. And so Five and Six is just expressing a hope that perhaps someday, we will be able to come up with some sort of theory that will be able to explain the fine-tuning of the Universe for intelligent life. I want to be speaking more about that a bit this evening, but I'll just leave that point aside this morning.
Take Step 3, for example. 'Step Three: The Temptation is a false one.' That is, the temptation to infer design, that is because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. Now, Dawkins' claim here in Step 3, that you\re not justified in inferring design as the best explanation, the complex order of the Universe, because then a new problem arises: namely, who designed the designer?
It seems to me however, that this rejoinder is flawed in at least two ways. First of all, in order to realize that an explanation is the best one, you don't need to have an explanation for the explanation. In order to realize that an explanation is the best, you don't need to have an explanation of the explanation. This is an elementary point in the Philosophy of Science concerning inference to the best explanation.
For example, if archaeologists digging in the earth were to come across artifacts resembling hatchet heads, pottery shards and arrow heads, they would be justified in inferring that these were the products of some unknown group of people, rather than the chance results of a processes of sedimentation and metamorphosis, even if they had no explanation whatsoever for who this unknown people group were or how they came to be there.
Similarly, if astronauts were to find a pile of machinery on the dark side of the moon, they would be justified in inferring that this was the product of intelligent design, even if they had no idea whatsoever who manufactured this machinery and how it came to be there. In order to recognize that an explanation is the best, you don't have to have an explanation of the explanation.
In fact, requiring that immediately launches you into an infinite regress, right? So that nothing could ever be explained, and science would be destroyed. So, oddly enough, Dawkins is enunciating a principle here which would be destructive of natural science itself. So, in the case at hand, in order to recognize that Intelligent Design is the best explanation of the appearance of design in the Universe, you don't need to be able to explain the designer.
But second point. Dawkins thinks that in the case of a divine designer, the designer is just as complex as the thing to be explained, so that no explanatory advance is made in postulating such a designer. Now this objection raises all sorts of interesting questions about the role played by simplicity in assessing competing explanations.
For example, how is simplicity to be weighted, in comparison to other criteria for theory assessment? Like explanatory power, explanatory scope, degree of ad hoc-ness, and so forth. The fact is that many times in science, we may prefer a theory that is less simple because it has greater explanatory power or greater explanatory scope. It requires to skill to weigh the different factors in theory assessment against one another in order to arrive at the best explanation. You can't always simply go with the simplest explanation. But leave those questions aside for this morning.
I think Dawkins' fundamental mistake lies in his assumption that a divine designer is an entity which is comparable in complexity to the Universe. He thinks that the designer is just as, or more complex, than the Universe itself, and it seems to me that this is patently false. As an unembodied mind, God is a remarkably simple entity.
As a non-physical entity, a mind is not composed of parts, and its salient properties like self-consciousness, rationality, volition, are essential to it. In contrast, to the contingent and variegated Universe with all of its inexplicable quantities and constance. In contrast to that, a divine mind is startlingly simple. It is an uncomposed spiritual or mental substance or entity that has no physical parts whatsoever.
Now certainly, a mind may have complex ideas, it might be thinking of infinitesimal calculus, this morning, for example. But the mind itself is a remarkable simple entity. Dawkins has evidently confused a mind's ideas, which may indeed be very complex, with the mind itself, which is a remarkable simple entity. Therefore, postulating a divine mind behind the variegating and complex Universe most definitely does represent an advance in simplicity, whatever that is worth.
So it seems to me that Step 3's argument is patently false and therefore the argument again collapses even if it were valid in the first place. Other steps in Dawkins' argument I think are also problematic, but I think enough has been said to demonstrate that this argument does absolutely nothing to undermine a design inference for a creator of the Universe, not to speak of it serving as a justification for atheism."
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